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Background: This study investigated the role of cognitive mechanisms underlying obsessive 
compulsive and panic disorders in psychosis, and in particular, their possible contributions to 
acute psychosis. Method: A total of 90 participants were recruited comprising three equal-
size groups, including two clinical groups (acute and stable) and one non-clinical matched 
control group. Symptom severity and distress was assessed using the PSYRATS, and 
questionnaire measures of anxiety and obsessive beliefs were administered to all participants. 
Results: Individuals with a diagnosis of psychosis reported significantly higher levels of 
obsessional beliefs and anxiety sensitivity than the non-clinical group. Furthermore, acutely 
psychotic patients reported a significantly higher sense of responsibility and catastrophic 
misinterpretation than the stable psychiatric controls, and than samples of OCD and GAD 
patients. Conclusions: Results suggest that these anxiety processes are particularly important 
during acute psychotic episodes, beyond the reported comorbidity. The theoretical and 
clinical implications of these findings, the limitations of the methodology employed, and 
suggestions for future research are discussed. 
Keywords: Acute psychosis, anxiety, catastrophic misinterpretations, cognitive distortions, 
heightened responsibility, obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Great benefits have been had from applying concepts from anxiety disorders to psychosis –
but are there further useful ideas and techniques that can help? Different cognitive models of 
psychosis hypothesize that different cognitive processes might be involved, some of which 
are particular to psychosis (e.g. Bentall, 1990; Chadwick, Birchwood and Trower, 1996; 
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Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler and Bebbington, 2002). Research has provided compelling 
empirical evidence for the role of cognitive processes on the cognitive, behavioural, 
affective, and physiological responses to positive symptoms of psychosis and its severity 
(Bentall, Kinderman and Kaney, 1994; Fear and Healy, 1997; Garety, Hemsley and Wessley, 
1991; Peters, Day and Garety, 1997; Peters, Joseph and Garety, 1999; Young and Bentall, 
1997).  
Some cognitive models of positive symptoms of psychosis have much in common 
with cognitive approaches to other psychological problems, especially anxiety disorders. For 
instance, Morrison, Haddock and Tarrier (1995) suggested that intrusive thoughts, if 
attributed to an external source, may result in auditory hallucinations because of their cultural 
unacceptability. Morrison (1998) further proposed that beliefs about the potential threat such 
intrusive thoughts pose to the physical or psychological integrity of the individual mediate 
the emotional, physiological, and behavioural response to them, in a similar manner to 
catastrophic misinterpretations in panic. These misinterpretations trigger safety-seeking 
behaviours and hypervigilance, which would tend to maintain the vicious cycle by preventing 
belief disconfirmation. Freeman, Garety and Kuipers (2001) found that safety-seeking 
behaviours were a common form of acting on persecutory delusions, and that 96% of their 
sample (N = 25) had used safety-behaviours the preceding month. They also reported a 
significant association between the intensity of distress of the delusion and a greater use of 
safety behaviours. Freeman and colleagues (2007) hypothesized that by preventing 
disconfirmation of threat (delusional) beliefs, catastrophic misinterpretations are likely to be 
maintained by the safety-behaviour itself in a similar way as in other anxiety disorders, and 
in particular OCD (Salkovskis, 1991; Wells et al., 1995). Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman 
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and Bebbington’s (2001) multi-factorial account of psychosis underscores the role of 
emotional processes, and anxious states, in the formation and maintenance of psychotic 
symptomatology. They suggested that previous emotional distress affects the content of 
delusions, and this subsequently influences levels of emotional distress by providing a 
“threat-theme” to delusions.  
A further area that has received recent attention in the literature on psychosis is the 
role of metacognitive beliefs (another anxiety-derived concept) in the occurrence and 
maintenance of psychotic disorders. For example, Baker and Morrison (1998) compared 
metacognitive beliefs of non-patient controls, patients with schizophrenia who experienced 
auditory hallucinations, and patients with similar diagnosis who did not experience 
hallucinations. They reported that patients experiencing hallucinations scored higher than 
controls on metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and danger of their thoughts, hold 
more positive beliefs about worry, and showed greater bias when processing emotionally 
charged information. Metacognitive beliefs have also been positively associated with and are 
predictive of delusion and hallucination proneness (Jones and Fernyhough, 2006; Larøi and 
Van der Linden, 2005; Morrison, French and Wells, 2007). For example, individuals 
experiencing auditory hallucinations scored significantly higher than psychiatric and non-
psychiatric controls on negative beliefs regarding the uncontrollability and danger of 
intrusive thoughts; and these beliefs have been shown to be a good predictor of auditory 
hallucinations (Morrison and Baker, 1998; Morrison and Wells, 2003). 
Figures reported by different studies clearly indicate that there is an extensive 
comorbidity between positive psychotic symptoms and all major forms of anxiety disorders 
(Cosoff and Hafner, 1998). The high co-occurrence of anxiety and psychosis have been 
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reported in weeks preceding an acute relapse of psychosis (Herz and Melville, 1980), during 
the acute episode (Emsley, Oosthuizen, Joubert, Roberts and Stein, 1999), and in the stable 
phase of the illness (Moorey and Soni, 1994). Approximately, figures reported by different 
studies indicate 10% for comorbid phobias, 35% comorbid panic, 13% social anxiety, 15-
40% obsessive compulsive disorder, 20-30%  panic attacks, and 15-30% PTSD. Most of 
these figures are considerably higher than in the general population (Robins and Regier, 
1991; Tien and Eaton, 1992; Neria, Bromet, Sievers, Lavelle and Fochtmann, 2002; Tibbo, 
Kroetsch, Chue and Warneke, 2000). The question of causality has been raised by different 
authors: Is it that psychosis causes anxiety symptoms?; Could anxiety be a vulnerability 
marker for psychosis?; Are other variables accounting for both?; or Do they simply co-exist 
or inter-relate? These questions as yet remain unanswered. Further longitudinal and 
prospective studies are currently underway and will help to clarify some of these issues. As 
pointed out by Turnbull and Bebbington (2001), the high prevalence of comorbidity is not 
enough to conclude that both disorders share similar cognitive processes, but suggests further 
investigations of underlying cognitive mechanisms. For example, despite the epidemiological 
evidence of the strikingly frequent association between schizophrenia and OCD or panic, 
many of the key cognitive processes relevant to these anxiety disorders (heightened 
responsibility for harm, thought-action fusion and catastrophic misinterpretations) have not 
yet been investigated in acute psychosis.  
 
Heightened responsibility (HR)  
Inflated perceptions of responsibility for harm (Rachman, 1976) became the cornerstone of 
Salkovskis’ (1985) influential cognitive model of OCD. This model postulates that OCD 
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symptomatology is associated with appraisals of personal responsibility both for unwanted 
intrusive thoughts and their dangerous consequences. These appraisals lead to negative mood 
and guide behaviour in an attempt to neutralize responsibility and/or reduce the likelihood of 
harm, following the belief that they may have the necessary power to prevent anticipated 
negative outcomes. HR can result in the person becoming hypervigilant, experiencing 
increased intrusions and perceived threats (Salkovskis et al., 1996), as well as substantial 
self-blame and depression. Empirical studies have supported the importance of HR in OCD 
(Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997; Salkovskis and Kirk, 1996). Furthermore, experimental 
manipulations of responsibility in OCD patients (Arntz, Voncken and Goosen, 2007) and 
non-patients (Mancini, D’Olimpio and Cieri, 2004) have been associated with an increase in 
obsessive compulsive behaviours, yielding further support for Salkovskis’ model, and 
suggesting a possible causal role of responsibility beliefs.  
In 2003, the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG), an 
international research group, proposed a key psychometric factor among OCD-style beliefs 
was Responsibility/Threat estimation, and suggested that it could also be significant in other 
maladaptive cognitive states. Indeed, inflated responsibility has received great empirical and 
theoretical attention in recent years and Salkovskis’ cognitive model, or part of it, has been 
extended to a wide range of other disorders such as PTSD and GAD (Tolin, Worhunsky and 
Maltby, 2006). Gumley, White and Power (1999) included appraisals of responsibility for 
harm to themselves or others as an important factor in their theoretical cognitive model of 
psychotic relapse. However, this contention needs to be empirically tested. A heightened 
sense of responsibility for harm to themselves or others, accompanied by a need to take 
action to stop a perceived impending catastrophe, may contribute to the need to respond, be 
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hypervigilant, suspicious, and protect themselves through the use of safety-behaviours in 
individuals experiencing acute psychotic symptoms. 
 
Catastrophic misinterpretations (CM) 
Clark (1986) postulated that CM (automatic cognitive style characterized by a tendency to 
imagine the worst possible outcome) of bodily sensations are central to the occurrence of 
panic attacks. This process of catastrophic worry is associated with emotional distress, which 
in turn instigates further catastrophizing (Davey and Levy, 1998). Birchwood (1996) makes a 
similar point that the appraisals made by psychotic individuals to interpret internal/external 
events can trigger relapse. In this account, the fear of impending relapse triggers an 
emotional response that in turn may accelerate relapse.  
In spite of the high comorbidity and the occasional mention in the literature of similar 
processes, the presence of CM in individuals with acute psychotic symptoms has not been 
empirically evaluated. CM of external or internal events may be particularly important in 
acute stages by contributing to the idea that “something bad is going to happen” (fear of 
impending catastrophe) or that “there is something wrong with me” (fear of madness or 
relapse), possibly contributing to acute psychosis. 
 
The importance of acute episodes  
An important limitation of cognitive theories of psychosis is the fact that they do not 
differentiate between stages of illness (McGorry, Hickie, Yung, Pantelis and Jackson, 2006); 
they perhaps implicitly suggest these biases ebb and flow with psychotic relapse and 
recovery, but generally studies are conducted on people in remission. They also often neglect 
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the important issue of comorbidity mentioned above. Relapse is a deeply distressing 
experience for individuals, carers and friends, and is also a time when suicide is most likely 
(De Hert and Peuskens, 2000). Relapse is also toxic, as impairment accumulates with each 
subsequent episode, in realms such as function (Shepherd, Watt, Falloon and Nigel, 1989), 
damage to social networks and increased residual positive symptoms when next in remission 
(Birchwood, Jackson and Fowler, 2000). While it would seem imperative to soothe a relapse 
as soon as possible, little is known specifically about psychological factors during the acute 
psychotic phase, other than extrapolating from data from people mostly in remission, or 
perhaps in the prodromal.  
This study was undertaken to investigate the presence of a HR and CM during acute 
psychotic episodes. It compared people acutely psychotic with stable and non-patient 
controls. It was hypothesized that:  
1.  Individuals with a diagnosis of psychosis who are acutely psychotic will have a higher 
sense of responsibility and perceived threat compared to clinically stable patients with 
a similar diagnosis. Both clinical groups will have a higher sense of responsibility and 
perceived threat compared to a non-clinical control group.  
2.  Individuals with a diagnosis of psychosis who are acutely psychotic will be more likely to 
misinterpret cognitive, physical, or social events in a catastrophic way than patients 
with similar clinical characteristics and considered to be clinically stable. Both 
clinical groups will be more likely to misinterpret cognitive, physical, or social events 
in a catastrophic way compared to a non-clinical control group.  
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3. Individuals with a diagnosis of psychosis who are acutely psychotic will score 
significantly higher on sense of responsibility and CM than the stable or the non-
clinical groups but less than anxious patients. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
The study used a cross-sectional design with three groups: 30 individuals acutely psychotic, 
30 individuals with a diagnosis of psychosis in stable phase of the illness, and 30 non-clinical 
controls. The inclusion criteria for the patient group were: adults aged 18-65 with a current 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective, schizophreniform, or non-specified psychosis, 
capable of informed consent. The exclusion criteria were: risk, primary diagnosis of alcohol/ 
substances, intellectual disability, and/or organic brain disease. Recruitment was from several 
inpatient and outpatient services within the North London area, including: 2 Crisis 
Resolution Teams; 6 In-patient wards; 3 Community Mental Health Teams; and 2 
Rehabilitation units. Participation was voluntary. Participants were not compensated, 
although travel expenses were reimbursed. Out of 72 patients approached by their clinician, 
60 consented to participate and were recruited (response rate 83%). Those that declined to 
enter the study resembled the study sample on important variables (i.e. diagnosis, age and 
gender). Participants on the non-clinical comparison group were selected in order to 
approximately match the patient group for age, gender and years of formal education; 
exclusion criteria included current or past history of severe mental illness. This group was 
recruited from a number of different public spaces such as shopping centres, sport facilities, 
and transport stations. Recruiting took place simultaneously at all sites over 6 months. 
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Measures 
 
Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2003). The OBQ-44 is a 
short self-report measure based on cognitive models of OCD considered to provide the best 
normative assessment of obsessional appraisals (OCCWG, 2003). It consists of three distinct 
subscales, scores ranging from 1 (disagree very much) to 7 (agree very much), thought to 
represent fundamental belief domains of OCD: a) Responsibility/Threat estimation (a 
perceived need to prevent harm from happening to oneself or others, fears of the 
consequences of inaction, and responsibility for bad things happening), 16 items; b) 
Perfectionism/certainty (high, absolute standards of completion, rigidity, concern over 
mistakes and feelings of uncertainty), 16 items; and c) Importance/control of thoughts (fears 
of the consequences of having intrusive and/or distressing thoughts or images, thought-action 
fusion, and the need to rid oneself of intrusive thoughts), 12 items. The OBQ-44 has been 
researched on obsessive, anxious and non clinical samples and has demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency (α = .95) and criterion-related validity (OCCWG, 2003). For the current 
study, the key subscale was Responsibility/Threat estimation. 
 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007). The ASI-3 is an 18-item self-
report measure of anxiety sensitivity with a three-factor structure, including: (1) physical 
concerns (e.g. belief that palpitations lead to cardiac arrest); (2) cognitive concerns (e.g. 
belief that concentration difficulties lead to insanity); and (3) social concerns (e.g. belief that 
publicly observable anxiety reactions will elicit social rejection). Subscales scores can be 
derived for the three factors, where higher scores are associated to greater psychopathology. 
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Respondents indicate their strength of endorsement for each item on a 5-point scale that 
ranges from 0 (very little) to 4 (very much), producing total scores in the range of 0–72. This 
scale has shown grater psychometric properties than the original ASI, and good reliability 
and validity on a sample of over 4,000 participants across countries (Taylor et al., 2007).   
 
Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier and 
Faraher, 1999). The PSYRATS is a multi-dimensional semi-structured interview, designed to 
elicit and rate the severity of auditory hallucinations (PSYRATS-AH) and delusional beliefs 
(PSYRATS-DS). It consists of 17-items that clinicians must rate on a five-point scale (0-4), 
symptoms are rated over the preceding week. This tool has been shown to have good 
reliability and validity (Haddock et al., 1999) and is increasingly being used in psychological 
treatment (Lewis et al., 2002) and research studies (Startup, Freeman and Garety, 2007). 
Although the PSYRATS does not provide cut-off scores, values of ≥3 on individual items of 
subscales are considered to be measuring major/severe acuteness. The authors of these scales 
have identified the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein and Opler,  
1987) as the closest scale with which to make comparisons and judge PSYRATS’ validity; 
and have reported significant correlations between similar subscales on both measures 
(Drake, Haddock, Tarrier, Bentall and Lewis, 2007). A score of ≥4 (moderate/severe) on the 
hallucinations and delusions items of the PANSS has previously been used to determine 
severe acute psychotic states (e.g. Lewis et al., 2002; Tarrier et al., 2004) and items are 
consistent with those assessed by ≥3 on the PSYRATS. Therefore, it was decided that scores 
of ≥33 on the PSYRATS-AH and/or ≥15 on the PSYRATS-DS would identify severe and 
acute psychotic states. The first five patients recruited for each group were selected to test 
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inter-rater reliability using the PSYRATS. Two of the authors (OL and FN) rated each of the 
10 patients simultaneously and good reliability between the two raters was established. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaires during one interview with the first 
author. In order to establish the validity of the chosen questionnaires for the population of 
this study, the measures were piloted prior to commencing data collection. It was decided 
that no amendments were needed and that the questionnaires were appropriate for the client 
group of the study. All participants were given an identifying number for the study to be used 
on all questionnaires in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality at all times. 
 
Statistical analysis 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS for Windows (version 12.0.1, SPSS, 2004). Prior to 
analysis, data were examined for accuracy of data entry and missing values. There were no 
missing data, and no univariate outliers. After transformation all variables were normally 
distributed; consequently, parametric statistical analysis could be performed throughout. A 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used, where participant’s group was the 
fixed factor and scores in the different OBQ-44 and ASI-3 subscales were dependent 
variables. Subsequently, a series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) was 
conducted; where a significant difference was found (p<.05), pairwise comparisons using 
Games-Howell test were used to identify where this difference was. Using a MANOVA prior 
to several ANOVAs was intended to protect against inflated Type I error (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001). Additionally, MANOVA has greater power to detect an effect than several 
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ANOVAs, decreasing the probabilities of Type II error. All statistical tests of significance 
reported were two-tailed.  
 
Results 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the participants 
As can be seen in Table 1, the average age of the total sample was 39.5 years, males-females 
ratio 65:25, which is consistent with other psychosis samples. Over half of the sample were 
white males, spoke English as their first language, had attended college, were unemployed, 
and were single/divorced. The majority of the clinical sample met DSM-IV diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia (68%). These group had experienced psychotic symptoms for a 
mean of 3.2 (SD = 0.5) years, and had experienced an average of 4.1 (SD = 1.6) psychotic 
episodes. Mean PSYRATS for the clinical control group was 3.8 (SD = 6.6) and 48.2 (SD = 
15.1) for the acute group; these values suggest that patients in the acute group were 
experiencing severe distress associated with psychotic symptoms, with 83% experiencing 
auditory hallucinations, and 78% exhibiting some degree of delusional beliefs. There were no 
significant differences between the three groups on important variables: age; gender; ethnic 
group; English as first language; and education, indicating that the three groups were 
comparable. Furthermore, it was established that the patient groups were matched on 
important demographic and clinical characteristics. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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The mean scores and standard deviations were obtained for each of the three groups 
on all the measures, and results are displayed in Table 2. Chi-squared tests confirmed that 
patients in the acute group scored significantly higher than stables on both subscales of the 
PSYRATS, indicating a higher severity of psychotic symptomatology in the acute group 
(PSYRATS-AH ² (15) = 44.2, p< .001; PSYRATS-DS ² (15) = 41.8, p< .001). 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The MANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect for group, indicating 
that three groups differed significantly on their OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat estimation 
scores (F (2, 87) = 83.7, p<.001,  =.80). 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Sense of responsibility and perceived threat  
Planned univariate ANOVAs revealed that both psychotic groups scored significantly higher 
than the non-clinical group on OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat estimation (t (63) = 13.1, 
p<.001, r = .85), and that the acute group scored significantly higher than the stable group (t 
(57) = 2.5, p<.001, r = .32). For this hypothesis, the study had 99% power to detect an 
estimated effect size of  =.80, indicating a large power level (1- = .99). These results 
confirmed the first hypothesis, indicating that, as expected, acutely psychotic patients 
reported significantly higher levels of sense of responsibility and threat estimation than both 
the stable group and non-clinical participants. Additionally, the stable clinical group reported 
significantly higher levels of sense of responsibility and threat than the non-clinical group. 
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Hypothesis 2: Catastrophic misinterpretations  
There was a significant main effect for group (F (2, 87) = 35.8, p<.001,  =.66). Psychotic 
groups scored significantly higher than the non-clinical group on ASI-3 Cognitive Concerns 
(t (70) = 10.2, p<.001, r = .75); and the acute group scored significantly higher than stables (t 
(58) = 3.2, p<.01, r =.16). These results confirmed the cognitive aspect of the second 
hypothesis, demonstrating that, as predicted, acutely psychotic patients misinterpreted in a 
catastrophic manner their cognitive processes significantly more than stable patients and non-
clinical participants.  
Additionally, the three groups significantly differed on ASI-3 Physical concerns (F(2, 
87) = 7.9, p <.001,  =.36), and ASI-3 Social concerns (F (2, 87) = 4.9, p<.01,  =.28); 
however, the acute group did not score significantly higher than the control group on either 
ASI-3 Physical concerns (t (58) = 1.2, ns, r =.15), or ASI-3 Social concerns (t (56) = 1.3, ns, 
r =.17). For this hypothesis, the study had 99% power to detect an estimated effect size of 
 =.66. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Comparison with obsessive and anxious groups  
One-sample t-tests were carried out to compare the mean values of the present study to those 
obtained by other studies with anxious participants. Estimates of effect size were calculated 
by  dft
t
r


2
2
 , values r ≥ .30 were interpreted as indicating medium effect and r ≥ .50 as 
indicating large effect size. First, the results obtained on the OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat 
estimation subscale were compared to those reported by three studies using the same measure 
with anxious and OCD groups (Tables 3 and 4). Tolin et al. (2006) compared patients with a 
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diagnosis of OCD to anxious and non-clinical controls; by way of example, compared to 
Tolin et al.’s results the acute group in this study scored significantly higher than the OCD (t 
(29) = 7.9, p<.001, r = .83) and anxious groups (t (29) = 10.2, p<.001, r = .88) in OBQ-44 
Responsibility/Threat estimation; full statistics for the other comparisons are not reported for 
brevity’s sake.  
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here 
 
Taylor et al. (2006) distinguished between OCD-high and OCD-low and compared 
them with an anxious group. The acute group scored significantly higher than the reported 
means for all three groups reported by these authors on OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat 
estimation (t (29) = 1.9, p<.001, r = .33; t (29) = 10.5, p<.001; r = .89; t (29) = 7.4, p<.001, r 
=.81). The stable group also scored significantly higher than OCD-low and the anxious group 
(t (29) = 8.1, p<.001, r = .83; t (29) = 4.5, p<.001; r = .65). Finally, when mean scores are 
compared with data reported by Julien, O’Connor, Aardema and Todorov (2006) on different 
subtypes of OCD groups, the acute group scored significantly higher than all of the OCD 
groups (t (29) = 2.5, p<.01, r = .42; t (29) = 6.8, p<.001, r = .78; t (29) = 8.3, p<.001, r = .84; 
t (29) = 5.2, p<.001, r= .70, for each of the groups as indicated in Table 4). 
In summary, patients with acute psychosis scored significantly higher than all of the 
OCD and anxious groups on responsibility and threat estimation. Additionally, patients with 
a diagnosis of psychosis in stable phase also scored significantly higher than most OCD 
groups, with the exception of OCD Rumination and OCD-high groups. These are interesting 
results, but it is important to bear in mind that this difference could be due to the different 
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sample sizes of the groups compared and/or other differences between the groups, as the 
groups belong to different populations and the comparisons were made post-hoc. 
Second, results from the ASI were compared to mean scores of anxious groups. The 
ASI-3 is a shorter version of the ASI-R (36-items) and, although excellent psychometric 
properties have been reported, clinical data have not yet been published by other studies. 
Therefore, ASI-R total and subscales scores for the current sample were calculated and 
compared to those reported for several anxious groups and a non-clinical control by Deacon 
and Abramowitz (2006). Table 5 displays means, standard deviations - when available - and 
significance of one sample t-tests between groups. Participants with acute psychotic 
symptoms reported significantly higher levels of anxiety sensitivity than the total sample of 
anxious groups (t (29) = 2.4, p<.05, r = .41); and similar to the OCD and panic disorder 
groups. The stable group reported similar levels of anxiety sensitivity to the overall anxious 
sample and significantly less than the panic group (t (29) = -3.4, p<.001, r = .53). As 
indicated in Table 5, the acute group reported similar levels of anxiety sensitivity in most 
subscales as compared to anxious groups, with the clear exception of the “Fear of Cognitive 
Dyscontrol” subscale. This scale includes the exact same items as the previously reported 
ASI-3 Cognitive concerns subscale. Individuals in an acute psychotic state scored 
significantly higher than all the anxious groups and the total anxiety sample (t (29) = 5.4, 
p<.001, r = .71). Importantly, this difference remained significant when the acute group was 
compared with the GAD group which, as the cognitive model would predict, scored the 
highest out of the anxiety disorders  (t (29) = 2.4, p<.05, r = .41) on fear of cognitive 
dyscontrol. On the other hand, the stable group reported similar levels to those of the total 
anxious sample (t (29) = 9.4, n.s.).  
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Insert table 5 here 
 
In summary, these results are in line with the previous statistical analysis and 
highlight the significance of both CM of cognitive processes and inflated responsibility in 
psychosis, particularly at a time of acute psychosis. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in 
mind that the scales employed in this study had not been previously employed with psychotic 
patients and the norms currently available are based on anxious and non-clinical groups. 
Confidence in the conclusions may be increased through the conservative statistical tests 
used to protect against Type I error, and the high power level.  
 
Additional analyses - discriminant function analysis 
Group differences were further examined by conducting a discriminant function analysis. 
This procedure was used to determine which variables discriminated between naturally 
occurring groups, and was employed in addition to the traditional approach of using separate 
ANOVAs. This analysis further protected against inflated Type I error, it also provided 
information about the potential relationship between the dependent variables and group 
membership (Field, 2005). Since in a MANOVA the dependent variables were analysed 
simultaneously, it was decided to enter all the variables together when running the 
discriminant analysis (Field, 2005). Wilks’ lambda indicated that only the first variate (or 
combination of dependent variables) was significant (F (12) = .283, p<.001). Furthermore, 
eigenvalues showed that 96.4% of the variance was accounted for by the first variate. This 
indicated that the differences shown by the MANOVA could be explained in terms of one 
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underlying dimension. Standardized discriminant function coefficients gave the relative 
contribution of each variable, varying within 1 . Using standardized discriminant function 
coefficients it can be concluded that OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat contributed most to 
group separation (b = .79), followed by ASI-3 Cognitive concerns (b = .29), and OBQ-44 
Important/Thought control (b = .27). Finally, the group centroids - defined as the mean 
variate scores for each group - indicated that variate 1 distinctly discriminated between the 
non-clinical and the two clinical groups (notably the acute group, as the difference between 
these groups was greatest).  
 
Discussion 
Assuming that the data can be taken at face value (limitations will be addressed later), all 
mechanisms of OCD and panic tested were more prevalent in stable psychosis controls than 
in non-clinical controls; some were statistically even more prevalent in acute patients. It can 
be argued that some of these mechanisms are at least as extensive (and possibly more so) in 
acute psychosis than in their original conceptual target groups of OCD, panic or GAD. For 
OCD mechanisms this is at a level considerably greater than what might be expected for 
previously-reported co-morbidity.  
 
Inflated responsibility and threat estimation  
Looking at the results mechanism by mechanism, Responsibility/Threat estimation clearly 
escalated from non-clinical to stable to acute psychosis, and rose to levels beyond that seen in 
published OCD groups. This supports the hypothesis that inflated responsibility beliefs could 
be both a trait vulnerability factor and also be exacerbated as a state factor in acute psychosis, 
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contributing to the development and/or maintenance of positive psychotic symptoms. These 
results provide support to Gumley et al.’s (1999) suggestion that responsibility beliefs may 
be an important variable to consider in psychotic crisis. Cognitive processes shown to be 
significant in psychosis such as attribution and confirmatory bias, a tendency to jump to 
conclusions and to make overconfident judgements (Garety and Hemsley, 1994; Garety et 
al., 1991; Peters et al., 1999), may all contribute to exaggerated sense of responsibility; while 
other cognitive deficits such as impaired reality testing (Bentall and Slade, 1985) may be 
contributing to the sense of impeding threat. It is also possible that inflated levels of 
responsibility may be affecting other cognitive processes in the same way as Garety et al. 
(2001) has suggested are affected by inflated levels of anxiety; certainly it could increase 
anxiety itself.  
The findings of this study are in accordance with previous studies reporting a 
distorted or altered threat perception and threat estimation in individuals with a diagnosis of 
psychosis. It is now well established that people with persecutory delusions give preferential 
attention to threatening stimuli (e.g. Bentall, Kaney and Bowen-Jones, 1995; Mathews, 1990; 
Phillips, Senior and David, 2000). According to Salkovskis (1996) threat appraisals are 
determined by the interaction between the perception of how negative the consequences of a 
danger are and the perceived likelihood of the threat. It follows that significant 
overestimation of threat and catastrophic worry could also be interacting in such a way that 
they are significantly contributing to psychotic relapse. Statistical analyses revealed a 
significant positive correlation between heightened Responsibility/Threat estimation and CM 
of cognitive processes providing support for this argument. 
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Second, inflated responsibility and threat overestimation have been directly linked to 
maladaptive behaviour, increased occurrence of intrusions and perceived threat in OCD 
patients (Salkovskis et al., 1996). Furthermore, this belief domain has also been strongly 
linked to harming thoughts in OCD (Salkovskis, 1985) and to an increase of compulsive 
behaviours (Arntz et al., 2007). Negative appraisals of the personal responsibility for 
unwanted intrusive thoughts and their dangerous consequences (i.e. going mad, obeying 
command hallucinations) may be related to acute psychotic symptomatology in the same way 
as proposed in OCD. It is possible that HR during acute psychosis is also mediating people’s 
dysfunctional behaviours at a time of a crisis, such as withdrawal, safety-seeking, and 
hypervigilance.  
The possible link between inflated responsibility and command hallucinations is a 
complex one that merits separate discussion. A command hallucination is the experience of 
hearing a voice that consistently tells the hearer to do things, usually unpleasant or even 
deplorable things. People who hear command hallucinations may be constantly struggling to 
not comply with their voice, often bargaining or agreeing to do minor things to avoid having 
to do major ones.  It may be that items on the OBQ may seem more literally true for people 
hearing command hallucinations – they simply are more at risk for being responsible for 
catastrophes, in a very real sense. The present study did not note whether psychosis 
participants had command hallucinations or not, and future research could address this 
relationship. Possibly the similarity is purely semantics – the OBQ is inadvertently recording 
scores as if OCD mechanisms were at play when actually the contexts around command 
hallucinations and OCD are quite different. Alternatively, it might be that whether the 
content of the catastrophe comes from a source acknowledged as a bullying voice, or from 
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unwanted and worrying automatic thoughts (i.e. from command hallucinations or OCD), the 
process of worry and maintenance would be effectively the same. Every OCD catastrophe 
will have its own content, perhaps equally implausible or delusional to the observer as in the 
case of command hallucinations.  
There is a level of thought action fusion (TAF: the belief that having certain thoughts 
will lead to unwanted acts; Myers and Wells, 2005, p. 807) in both cases that presumably 
exacerbates the distress. Salkovskis considered TAF as a complex form of responsibility 
beliefs. TAF implies the belief that unwanted thoughts are morally equivalent to the repulsive 
actions featured in them, and/or the belief that having destructive thoughts increases the 
likelihood of harm coming true (Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman and Freeston, 1999). Some of 
the items included in the OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat subscale assess individuals’ TAF 
beliefs. Further research is needed to fully understand the role of HR in psychosis: is it akin 
to OCD, or is it more specific to psychotic symptoms and perhaps associated to command 
hallucinations?  
Although not a hypothesis of this study, the data show that perfectionism was also a 
real problem for the psychosis group, observed in the acute group at higher levels than in 
some OCD samples. This could be linked to “need for certainty” (Freeman et al., 2001), or  
idealism; in common with non-clinical young adults, people with psychosis can view the 
world in a romanticised way (Harrop and Trower, 2003). This may come as a shock to 
outside observers who see people with acute psychotic symptoms as being generally 
disorganized, often unkempt; perhaps a more realistic take would be “Fear of Negative 
Evaluation”, especially for someone experiencing critical voices for whom everything they 
get wrong provides more material for their voice to use against them. 
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The fear of an imminent catastrophe 
The second hypothesis tested confirmed that psychotic groups catastrophically misinterpreted 
cognitive, physical and social stimuli significantly more than non-patients. Furthermore, 
higher levels of anxiety sensitivity were reported at a time of acute psychosis than during a 
stable phase of the disorder. However, this latter difference was mainly accounted for by the 
Cognitive concerns variable. This is in line with studies reporting an association between 
metacognitions and both delusions (Freeman and Garety, 1999; Morrison and Wells, 2003) 
and hallucinations (García-Montes, Perez-Alvarez, Soto-Balbuena, Perona-Garcelan and 
Cangas, 2005). Startup et al. (2007) investigated the association between persecutory 
delusions and catastrophic worry. They used a lengthy catastrophizing interview, preventing 
direct comparisons with the results from the current study. Nonetheless, their study found 
that individuals with persecutory delusions scored in a comparable range to treatment-
seeking individuals with GAD, and showed a tendency towards catastrophic worry. Startup et 
al. (2007) only recruited patients with delusions, preventing conclusions about the general 
relevance of catastrophic worry in psychosis. 
Additionally, there could be an association between the reported high levels of past 
traumatic history in individuals with psychotic disorders (Morrison, Frame and Larkin, 2003) 
and their increased catastrophic worry. Past experience of traumatic events may be 
significantly contributing to the individual’s threat perception and the expectancy of an 
imminent disaster (cognitive, physical or social in nature). Further research is required to 
fully understand the role of catastrophic worry in psychosis. 
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Limitations 
The data being cross-sectional mean that little can be said about cause and effect. It remains 
conceivable that the differences observed between clinical groups may be due to differences 
in levels of symptomatology in the sample, and not only due to the acute/stable status of the 
participants, or due to possible confounding variables such as comorbid anxiety, duration of 
untreated psychosis, recent bereavement, or financial stressors. It could also be argued that 
the differences found may reflect greater psychopathology or more “damaging histories” 
rather than processes specific to the acute phase. However, the compared groups were 
matched on length of illness and number of admissions. Replicating the study with larger 
numbers would seem important, as would be longitudinal follow-up.   
 
Clinical implications and future research 
Addressing concerns about impending catastrophes and responsibility thereof may be 
clinically beneficial and could result in decreasing the discomfort associated, ultimately 
reducing severity and/or duration of the acute episode. This is in line with suggestions of 
theoretical “state-specific cognitive behaviour therapy” (Marlowe, 2003). Thought-action 
fusion can be fruitfully addressed, as might behavioural experiments aimed at reducing 
dependence on safety behaviours (although caution will obviously be needed when doing this 
with command hallucinations). Perfectionism may also be a fruitful clinical focus, as will 
general education about the ways our minds work (metacognition work) and other ways of 
experiencing thoughts such as mindfulness (Chadwick, 2006). Presently, front-line clinicians 
do not explicitly pursue the assessment and treatment of anxiety symptoms, and their 
significance (Turnbull and Bebbington, 2001) with psychotic patients. A first step may 
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involve providing further training to front-line clinicians in the assessment and management 
of anxiety. 
Future research in this area should take into account the limitations encountered by 
this study and consider the replication of these findings with a larger sample size and using 
longitudinal methodology. Additionally, potential differences between cognitive processes in 
patients presenting with first psychotic episode compared to clients who have experienced 
multiple crises episodes could also fruitfully be examined, in line with recent calls for “stage 
of condition” related research (McGorry et al., 2006) and intervention (Haddock and Lewis, 
2005). Qualitative methods could be considered to allow fuller exploration of individuals’ 
experiences during acute psychotic phase; in particular, to establish possible threat perception 
and catastrophic worry themes, and how they relate to voice activity, particularly command 
hallucinations, as the content of the processes described here (in the same way that 
neutralizing behaviours such as washing hands are the content of OCD-style processes). In 
conclusion, the results of the current study indicate that obsessive and panic-like mechanisms 
are very relevant in psychosis; this seems to offer new opportunities for clinical work with 
people with acute psychosis and also a renewed research agenda to understand acute 
psychotic states.  
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Table 1. Demographic and clinical data of clinical sample (N = 60) 
Variable Category Acute 
n=30 
Stable 
n=30 
    
DSM-IV diagnosis 
 
Schizophrenia 
Schizoaffective 
Other psychotic disorder 
20  
6  
4 
22  
4  
4  
Duration of crisis 
 
< 1 week 
< 1 month 
2-4 months 
2  
17  
11  
0  
0  
0  
Subject to Mental Health Act 12 Y, 18 N 3 Y, 27 N 
Length of illness 
 
0-3 years 
3-5 years 
> 5 years 
5  
23  
2  
6  
23  
1  
Previous relapses   
 
< 3 relapses 
> 3 relapses 
7  
23  
8  
22 
Accommodation 
 
In-patient ward 
Supported housing 
Local Authority/Association 
Home owner or private rent 
15  
2  
12  
2  
5 
8  
15  
2  
Social network 
     
Services 
Services, Family 
Services, Family, Friends    
12 
11  
7  
6  
12  
12  
Drug use in the last 6 
months 
 
Alcohol  
      use/abuse        
      abstinence  
Cannabis     
       use/abuse        
       abstinence 
 
15  
15  
 
7  
23 
 
14  
16  
 
10  
20 
History of violence 14Y, 16N 10Y, 20N 
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Table 2. Mean scores, standard deviations and significance values  (N = 90) 
 
Measure; subscale 
 
Acute 
n= 30 
(a) 
 
Stable 
 n= 30 
(b) 
 
Non-clinical  
n= 30 
(c) 
 
Significance 
p <.001 
 
PSYRATS Total 
 
48.2 (15.1) 
 
3.8 (6.6) 
 
- 
 
 
  PSYRATS-AH 
 
31.0 (14.7) 
 
1.93 (5.25) 
 
- 
 
 
  PSYRATS-DS 
 
17.1 (8.0) 
 
1.90 (3.25) 
 
- 
 
     
 
OBQ-44 total  
 
208.1 (38.2) 
 
184.7 (42.8)  
 
112.6 (30.8) 
 
a<b<<c 
 
OBQ-44 Responsibility/ 
Threat estimation  
 
84.1 (17.8)  
 
72.8 (15.3) 
 
 
38.0 (11.4) 
 
 
a<b<<c 
 
OBQ-44 Perfectionism/ 
Certainty  
 
75.7 (17.8) 
 
69.5 (20.7) 
 
 
55.3 (18.6) 
 
b<c 
a<c 
 
OBQ-44 Importance/ 
Control of thought  
 
48.3 (13.0)  
 
42.5 (16.9) 
 
 
19.3 (6.4) 
 
b<c 
a<c 
 
 
ASI-3 total  
 
34.7 (14.5)  
 
24.7 (15.2) 
 
10.9 (5.7) 
 
a<b<<c 
 
ASI-3  
Physical concerns 
 
9.1 (6.5) 
 
7.3 (5.9) 
 
3.1 (2.6) 
b<c 
a<c 
 
ASI-3  
Cognitive concerns 
 
15.6 (7.8) 
 
9.3 (7.5)  
 
1.8 (1.8) 
a<b<<c 
 
ASI-3  
Social concerns  
 
9.9 (5.8)  
 
8.2 (5.1) 
 
5.9 (3.6) 
a<c 
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a Indicates significant differences between the acute and the compared group at least at p<.01 
b Indicates significant differences between the stable and compared group at least at p<.05 
c Indicates significant differences between the control and the compared group at p<.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Mean OBQ-44 scores compared to OCD, anxious, and non-clinical groups (mean, SD) 
                                            Present study Tolin et al. (2006) Taylor et al. (2006) 
 
Subscale 
Acute 
n=30 
Stable 
n=30 
Non-clin 
n=30 
OCD 
N=89 
Anxious 
n=72 
Non clin 
n=33 
OCD-high 
n=124 
OCD-low 
n=120 
Anxious 
n=103 
Non clin 
n=86 
 
Responsibility/ 
Threat 
estimation 
 
84.1  
(17.8) 
 
72.8  
(15.3) 
 
38.0  
(11.4) 
 
58.19a,b,c 
(24.78) 
 
51.47a,b,c  
(20.10) 
 
32.06 a,b  
(11.14) 
 
78.3c   
(17.8) 
 
50.4 a,b,c 
(17.4) 
 
59.8 a,b,c  
(22.8) 
 
34.1 a,b 
(13.0) 
 
 
Perfectionism 
Certainty 
 
75.7 
(17.8) 
 
69.5  
(20.7) 
 
55.3  
(18.6) 
 
67.25 a,c  
(22.29) 
 
57.44 a,b 
(21.00) 
 
38.21 a,b,c  
(16.51) 
 
80.2 b,c   
(17.0) 
 
59.2 a,b  
(21.6) 
 
65.7 a,c  
(21.7) 
 
41.4 a,b,c   
(18.1) 
 
Importance  
Control thought  
 
48.3  
(13.0) 
 
42.5  
(16.9) 
 
19.3 
(6.4) 
 
56.69 a,b,c  
(22.69) 
 
53.53 a,b,c   
(18.25) 
 
37.03 a,c  
(13.21) 
 
53.7a,b,c   
(12.2) 
 
27.1 a,b,c 
(7.2) 
 
41.4 a,c  
(18.1) 
 
20.6 a,b 
(9.5) 
  
41
41
 
 
 
a Indicates significant differences between the acute and the compared group at least at p<.01 
b Indicates significant differences between the stable and compared group at least at p<.05  
c Indicates significant differences between the control and the compared group at p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mean OBQ-44 scores compared to OCD types (mean, SD) 
                                                    Present study Julien et al. (2006) 
 
Subscale 
Acute 
n=30 
Stable 
n=30 
Non-clin 
n=30 
Rumination 
n=18 
Washing 
n=18 
Checking 
n=14 
Non-specific 
n=71 
Total OCD 
n=126 
Responsibility 
Threat estimation  
 
84.1  
(17.8) 
 
72.8  
(15.3) 
 
38.0  
(11.4) 
 
75.7 a,c 
(18.0) 
 
62.4 a,b,c   
(24.9) 
 
56.6 a,b,c 
(20.1) 
 
67.3 a,b,c 
(23.9) 
 
66.6 a,b,c 
(23.2) 
 
Perfectionism 
Certainty  
 
75.7 
(17.8) 
 
69.5  
(20.7) 
 
55.3  
(18.6) 
 
82.0 b,c 
(19.8) 
 
71.3 c 
(24.1) 
 
73.1 c  
(22.6) 
 
79.4 b,c 
(22.5) 
 
75.7 c 
(22.3) 
 
Importance  
Control thought  
 
48.3  
(13.0) 
 
42.5  
(16.9) 
 
19.3 
(6.4) 
 
52.8 b,c 
(16.4) 
 
35.4 a,b,c 
(14.5) 
 
35.0 a,b,c 
(6.6) 
 
44.4 c 
(16.7) 
 
41.5 a,c 
(15.8) 
  
42
42
 
 
Total Anxiety, mean of all anxiety disorders; PD, panic disorder; OCD, obsessive compulsive disorder; Soc.Ph, social phobia; GAD, generalized anxiety 
disorder; Spec.Ph, specific phobia. SD values not available from published data by Deacon and Abramowitz (2006). 
a Indicates significant differences between the acute and the compared group at p<.01 
b Indicates significant differences between the stable and compared group at p<.01 
c Indicates significant differences between the control and the compared group at p<.001 
 
 
Table 5. Mean scores on ASI-R as compared to other anxious and non-clinical groups (mean, SD) 
                                                 Present study Deacon and Abramowitz (2006) 
 
Subscale 
Acute 
n=30 
Stable 
n=30 
Control 
n=30 
Total 
Anxiety 
n=220 
PD 
n=52 
OCD 
n=92 
GAD 
n=23 
Spec.Pho 
n=18 
Soc. Pho 
n=35 
Non 
clinical 
n=453 
ASI-R total  65.43 
(28.56) 
45.83 
(29.73) 
24.33 
(10.37) 
 
53.4 a,c 64 b,c 56 c 48 a,c 49 a,c 50 a,c 31 a,b,c 
Fear of respiratory symptoms   18.67 
(11.21) 
13.9 
(11.03) 
8.23 
(4.77) 
 
14.8 c 19 b,c 16.5 c 12 a,c 16 c 10.5a,c 10 a,c 
Fear of publicly observable 
anxiety reactions 
13.43 
(7.95) 
11.13 
(6.68) 
9.26 
(4.42) 
 
15.6 b,c 
 
16 b,c 13 c 13 c 15 b,c 21 a,b,c 11 c 
Fear of  cognitive dyscontrol  15.63 
(7.83) 
9.27 
(7.51) 
1.77 
(1.81) 
 
7.56 a,c 
 
8 a,c 7.8 a,c 9a,c 5.5a,b,c 7.5 a,c 2.5 a,b,c 
Fear of physical catastrophe 10.93 
(8.11) 
8.23 
(7.85) 
2.93 
(3.41) 
8.8 c 
 
11 c 13 b,c 7.5 c 7.5 c 5 a,b,c 4 a,b 
